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Supreme Court decisions often make headlines-for a day or so.
Then, the nation's attention usually moves on. But there is nothing
usual about the Court's decision in Kelo v. New London,' and despite
the continued anxiety of the war on terror, the nation's attention re-
mains transfixed upon what many see as an injustice and an abuse of
eminent domain power sanctioned by a narrow 54 majority. Oth-
ers-mostly public officials-assess the outcome quite differently, as
the pursuit of overriding community good. Those skeptical of the
Court's handiwork cannot credit how forcing families from their
homes for the economic development advantage of other private
owners is explainable by the constitutional words "public use." The
Court's defenders say it is all a matter of settled precedent.
Scott Bullock, who with the Institute for Justice represented
Susette Kelo and the other families whose homes were targeted for
destruction in Kelo, concurs in the public's puzzlement and dismay.
Thomas Merrill of Columbia does not. Professor Merrill sees the de-
cision in Kelo as an unsurprising application of existing case law.
Unsurprising or not, Congress and dozens of states have intro-
duced legislation seeking to bolster the protection of private prop-
erty. Legislation has passed the House expressing the view that "emi-
nent domain should never be used to advantage one private party
over another."2 Proposed federal legislation would limit the use of
federal power or money for condemnations or expressly exclude such
private economic development from the meaning of "public use. 3
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I Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2 H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005).
3 S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3083, 109th Cong. (2005).
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Alabama has become the first state to pass legislation precluding the
use of condemnation "for the purposes of private retail, office, com-
mercial, industrial, or residential development; or primarily for en-
hancement of tax revenue,"4 obviously reacting to the very facts which
gave rise to Kelo. The Supreme Court of Ohio, relying upon its own
state constitution, unanimously reached a determination that
"[a]lthough economic factors may be considered in determining
whether private property may be appropriated, the fact that the ap-
propriation would provide an economic benefit to the government
and community, standing alone, does not satisfy the public-use re-
quirement of Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution."5
Susette Kelo and her neighbors remained under the threat of the
bulldozer for an extended period. The engine of eminent domain
was temporarily placed in neutral, but it ultimately worked its will.
Connecticut defeated a proposal to protect "owner-occupied residen-
tial real property consisting of four or fewer dwelling units" from be-
ing condemned "if the resulting project will be privately owned or
controlled., 6 At the governor's urging, however, the state did put in
place a moratorium to study matters further. In the process of study,
most of the owners settled for compensation, and while Nurse Kelo's
house was saved from the wrecking ball, it was only because it was
moved to a new neighborhood.
New London's particular fate resolved-however uneasily and
awkwardly-the Court's opinion shined a light upon cases far beyond
Nurse Kelo's neighborhood. At oral argument, counselor Bullock
cautioned the Court about the effect of disregarding constitutional
text.7 Justice O'Connor and the dissent were, in fact, deeply trou-
bled. "The specter of condemnation hangs over all property," wor-
ried Justice O'Connor. "Nothing is to prevent the State from replac-
ing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall,
or any farm with a factory.,
8
The majority dismissed these concerns as mere "hypothetical [s] ."9
Rejecting the asked-for categorical exclusion of economic develop-
ment takings as well as the textual meaning of either actual public
ALA. CODE § 11-47-170(b) (2005) (amending ALA. CODE § 11-47-170(b) (1975)).
5 Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio 2006). The state court indicated that it
would also apply heightened scrutiny when reviewing statutes regulating the use of eminent
domain, and in so doing, found the use of the terminology "deteriorating area" as a standard
for determining whether private property is subject to appropriation to be void for vagueness.
6 H.R. 5062, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005).
7 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005)
(No. 04-108), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argumenttranscripts/04-108.pdf (warning that a broad interpretation would put all private
property at risk of condemnation).
8 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676.
9 Id. at 2667.
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use or an assured right of public access, Justice Stevens for the major-
ity opined that other cases "can be confronted if and when they
arise." 0 Well, they're here. The ink was barely dry on the opinion
when a Texas town filed to seize two family-owned seafood companies
in favor of a fancier business with a private boat marina." A few
weeks after Justice O'Connor's prescient remark, a Missouri munici-
pality voted to condemn eighty-five homes and small businesses for a
$165-million shopping center and office complex-though popular
opposition may now have blunted the project.12 Yet another city
plans to take thirty homes and fifteen small businesses for a Lowe's
and a strip mall.
3
These goings-on may well require the new Roberts Court to revisit
the matter. On the surface, the exchange of Chief Justice John Rob-
erts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito for the late William Rehnquist
and the retired Sandra Day O'Connor does not likely change the vote
count. Yet, both of these new voices may be capable of persuading
the equivocally concurring Anthony Kennedy to be more open to
supplying a future result closer to the actual words of the Fifth
Amendment. Presumably, adopting that bright line rule would sup-
ply needed reassurance to homeowners, be faithful to original under-
standing, and keep the Court out of the sticky business of second-
guessing municipal judgment. But would it be at the cost of worthy
redevelopment?
Beyond honoring text, alternative judicial avenues are less attrac-
tive. Mr. Bullock argued originally in Kelo that the level of judicial
deference to municipal judgment should be in direct relation to the
reasonable certainty of the touted economic benefits. 4 That standard
has the resonance of practical policy, but it would have cut against
the grain of the separation of powers. That said, one would have to
be blind to the realities of urban redevelopment not to notice that a
good many of the "benefits" of these takings are never realized.
Writes Steven Malanga, a contributing editor of City Journal,
"[t] hroughout the country, cities have liberally used eminent domain
to take land in order to build publicly subsidized mega-projects that
I0 !d.
See W. Seafood Co. v. City of Freeport, 346 F. Supp. 2d 892, 894 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (grant-
ing summary judgment in favor of city and economic development corporation).
1 See T. R. Reid, Missouri Condemnation No Longer So Imminent, WASH. POST, Sep. 6, 2005, at
A2 (detailing the sudden loss of support for an eminent domain plan in Sunset Hills, Mo.).
13 See Press Release, Institute for Justice, Floodgates Open: Tax Hungry Governments &
Land Hungry Developers Rejoice in Green Light from U.S. Supreme Court (June 29, 2005),
available at http://www.ij.org/private-property/connecticut/6_29_05pr.html (citing examples
of new condemnation projects across the county).
14 See Brief of Petitioners at 30-31, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (arguing that
uncertainty as to the economic benefits of taking property increases the risk that the property
will be taken for private use).
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have wasted tax dollars and distorted the private marketplace."' 5 In
New London itself, the homes to be wrecked are to facilitate a com-
mercial office building for which subsequent published reports indi-
cate there is no market.
6
Justice Kennedy is the judicial pivot possibility. Kennedy con-
curred separately suggesting that he understood the majority to allow
for a more demanding standard of review to apply to that subset of
economic development takings where there is "a plausible accusation
of impermissible favoritism to private parties." 7 That accusation, said
Kennedy, "should [be] treat[ed] ... as a serious one and [the trial
court should] review the record to see if it has merit."', 8 Justice Ken-
nedy supposed this had been done in Kelo,"' but a close look at the
record suggests it had not. At the time of trial, the specific private
beneficiaries had not even been identified ° and no development
agreement had even been signed.2' Thus, it was not possible for the
trial judge to have evaluated favoritism, let alone the question of
whether the public benefits to be supplied by the as-yet-unidentified
private party would be, as Justice Kennedy said, "so trivial or implau-
sible.2 2 In light of public anxiety, Justice Kennedy may welcome an-
other opportunity to more closely test the workability of his proffered
limitation.
The prospect for another high court consideration is, in light of
the nature of Supreme Court certiorari practice, not immediate.
Moreover, even if a Kelo sequel were to present itself, Professor
Merrill certainly has a point in saying that the difficulty the Court
faced in Kelo would remain the same: its own precedent. For exam-
ple, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkff22 the Court, per Justice
O'Connor, unanimously sustained a Hawaiian law that forced owners
of large estates to sell to their tenants. In Midkiff, the Court described
15 Steven Malanga, Public Benefit?, CrrY J., July 1, 2005, available at http://www.city-
journal.org/html/eon-07.01_05sm.html.
16 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 14, at 6 ("The study concluded that market condi-
tions do not justify new construction... on a speculative basis.").
17 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"8 Id.
19 See id. ("[T]he trial court conducted a careful and extensive inquiry into 'whether... the
development plan is of primary benefit to ... the developer.., and private businesses which
may eventually locate in the plan area....'" (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2 app. at
261, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108))).
20 See Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *43 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 13, 2002) ("The developer was chosen from a group of applicants. Space in the projected
office buildings has not been rented yet.").
2 See id. at *65 ("[T] here has been no development agreement signed...
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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its review of what constitutes a public use as "extremely narrow."
24
Indeed, summarizing matters in Midkiff the Court wrote that
[t]he mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is trans-
ferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that
taking as having only a private purpose. The Court long ago rejected any
literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public.25
To say that Midkiff and Berman are precedential "problem children" is
perhaps to state the obvious, but it is a reminder of how far those
cases departed from the natural law tradition of the early Supreme
Court. In Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance,2 6 for exampleJustice Patterson
questioned "whether the Legislature ha[s] authority to make an act,
divesting one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in another, even
with compensation., 27 And in Calder v. Bull,28 the Court noted that a
"law that takes propert from A, and gives it to B [would be] against
all reason and justice.,
2
Outside the Court's tangle with its past statements, it may well be
wondered how city leaders could ignore the nobility of Justice Patter-
son's founding sentiments. The answer to this quandary prompts a
closer look at the specific facts in Kelo, but the executive summary is
that "reason and justice" look different when an economically dis-
tressed community is the suitor of a wealthy manufacturer. In Febru-
ary 1998, Pfizer, Inc., a highly-profitable pharmaceutical company,
announced that it intended to build a research facility adjacent to the
Fort Trumbull neighborhood of New London, Connecticut." Three
months later, the city council authorized a private development cor-
poration to submit, for state review, a plan for a ninety-acre redevel-
opment of Fort Trumbull. 1 The development corporation, exercis-
ing the city's condemnation power, would take the property of the
homeowners, clear it, and then lease it to another local, private de-
24 Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)) (sustaining the use of emi-
nent domain in the nation's capital to clear blighted property even though it may later be trans-
ferred to other private owners).
25 Id. at 243-44.
26 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
27 Id. at 310.
28 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
29 Id. at 388.
so See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005) (outlining Pfizer's an-
nounced plans to build a research facility immediately adjacent to Fort Trumbull State Park).
See id. at 2659 (summarizing the New London Development Corporation's submission of
an integrated development plan centered on the Fort Trumbull area and the city council's ap-
proval for state-level review).
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veloper under a ninety-nine-year lease for $1.32 The private developer
would have sole discretion to select sub-tenants for the plan area.
Once the center of the whaling industry, it had been many years
since New London knew economic prosperity. Jobs left, people fol-
34
lowed and unemployment was higher than the national average.
The redevelopment plan was meticulously drafted, but to the indi-
viduals like Nurse Kelo and the other families affected, that was
hardly persuasive. Four homes are situated in parcel 3 of the plan,
which is designated for 90,000 square feet of high technology and of-
fice space, and eleven homes fall within parcel 4A which is slated for
something labeled "park support" for a proposed Fort Trumbull State
Park.3 5  The homeowners' properties constitute 1.54 acres of the
ninety-acre site.3 6 The bulk of the plan-over ninety acres-calling
for a hotel, conference center, marina, waterfront walkway, and a
Coast Guard museum were not implicated by the case.3 ' As a prag-
matic matter, one wonders why it was not possible to make plan
modifications to accommodate these homeowners. Perhaps, this,
too, illustrates the breadth of condemnation power the Court had al-
ready ceded pre-Kelo.
Hopes for the plan have been high and had included the creation
of hundreds of jobs and the generation of more than $680,000 in
property tax revenue.8 Of course, there are no guarantees. Even be-
fore the Supreme Court litigation, a study done by the redevelop-
ment corporation, itself, found new office construction on the parcel
3 site to be "uncertain" and concluded that "market conditions do
notjustify construction of new commercial space at Fort Trumbull on
a speculative basis."39 There have never been specific uses proposed
for parcel 4A apart from the demolition of the homes presently lo-
cated there.40 These facts deeply divided the Connecticut Supreme
32 See id. at 2660 n.4 (detailing the NLDC's negotiations with a private developer for the
lease of some parcels of land in the development plan).
3 See Virginia Groark, Connecticut Case Lit Fires of Rage, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2005, at 12 (re-
porting on New London's economic decline and current economic frailty).
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 (explaining that decades of economic decline lead to New
London being designated a "distressed municipality" and citing the 1998 unemployment rate,
which was nearly double that of the state).
35 See id. at 2659-60, 2672.
See Charles Lane, Justices Affirm Property Seizures: 5-4 Ruling Backs Forced Saes for Private De-
velopment, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at Al (noting the property holdings of the petitioners
who refused to sell).
37 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659 (listing the proposed uses for parcel 1, which does not contain
any property owned by petitioners).
38 See Lane, supra note 36 (discussing the expected benefits of the redevelopment program).
39 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 14, at 6 (quotingJoint Appendix at 47, 64).
40 See id. (explaining that at the time of trial there were no current plans for the develop-
ment of parcel 4A); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659 (noting that parcel 4A was to be used to sup-
port the state park or the marina, potentially as a parking lot).
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Court which decided 4-3 for the development corporation, finding
hoped-for economic development to be a valid public use and defer-
ring to the local entities to determine likelihood of its prospects.
41
While the case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the local
general circulation newspaper of New London revealed that six
months after the state supreme court ruled, the private developer
who received the "$1 per year ground lease has yet to build any pri-
vate projects., 42 Apparently, Pfizer no longer needed a luxury hotel,
as the local paper also reported that the hotel project has been put
on hold.43
The waxing and waning fortunes of the economic plan mattered
little to the Supreme Court, which, as already noted, ruled 5-4 that
"[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long ac-
cepted function of government. There is, moreover, no principled
way of distinguishing [it] from the other public purposes that we
have recognized.",44 The Constitution's limits on this governmental
power were few, as articulated by Justice Stevens. He conceded that
the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for
the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party.
Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext
of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private
benefit.
45
However, the New London planning process impressed Justice Ste-
vens. The Kelo takings "would be executed pursuant to a 'carefully
considered' development plan. 46 With plan in hand, it was appro-
priate, Stevens ruled, to give broad deference to legislative judgments
in this field.47
Dissenting and writing for four Justices, Justice O'Connor outlines
what is lost by the majority's deference:
To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting
from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic
development takings "for public use" is to wash out any distinction be-
tween private and public use of property-and thereby effectively to de-
41 See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 14, at 8 (paraphrasing the holding of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut that use of eminent domain to further economic development designed
to increase revenue and improve the local economy is encompassed by the Fifth Amendment).
42 Kate Moran, Source of Frustration, THE DAY (New London, Ct.), Sept. 30, 2004, at A5.
43 Kate Moran, Hotel Plan Not Viable, THE DAY (New London, Ct.),June 12, 2004, at C4.
44 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
45 Id. at 2661 (citations omitted); see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245
(1984) ("A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement;
it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.").
46 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
47 See id. at 2668 (declining to second-guess the City's redevelopment plans as long as the
question of public purpose has been decided).
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lete the words "for public use" from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 48
But how does Justice O'Connor escape the Court's deferential prece-
dents, some of which she, herself, authored? By recurring to text and
textual purpose and a bit of opinion revisionism.
The Constitution's intended protection of property includes the
cost-spreading implicit in the just compensation requirement, Justice
O'Connor notes, but also the respect for individual liberty and fair-
ness embedded in the overarching public use limitation.49 Property is
not fungible. Our lives and liberties may become bound up with
even the most modest dwelling, and "[g]overnment may compel an
individual to forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the
benefit of another private person. This requirement promotes fair-
ness as well as security,, 50 writes Justice O'Connor. To give the level
of deference envisioned by the majority would be to transmute the
public use limitation into "hortatory fluff."
5 1
As for the reshaping of the Court's cases, Justice O'Connor finds
three tenable bases for a finding of public use: where government
retains ownership (e.g., parks, roads), where ownership is transferred
to a private entity, but public use is ensured (e.g., common carriers,
like railways, utilities), and a very narrow and exceptional third cate-
gory, where an idiosyncratic exigency must be met.5 2 Obviously, the
third category can be the most problematic, but, it is here thatJustice
O'Connor locates the government's ability to remove the blight of
tenements as in Berman or to address highly unusual land concentra-
tions or oligopolies, as in Midkiff. Unlike the majority, the dissent
contends that no precedent ever categorically approved of economic
development takings as an unexamined or unexceptional public
use.5" To accept this deferential posture is not only unconstitutional,
writes Justice O'Connor, but "absurd., 54 Indulging this overly permis-
sive conception of public use would mean "that any single-family
home.., might be razed to make way for an apartment building, or
any church.., might be replaced with a retail store ....5 5
The dissent in Kelo also sought to resolve a previous mystery by
linking the outer limits of condemnation authority to the prevention
Id. at 2671 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
49 See id. at 2672 (explaining that the public use requirement limits the scope of the gov-
ernment's eminent domain power and protects individuals from suffering more than their fair
share of the public burden).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2673.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2675.
55 Id.
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of harm. Scholars have long been baffled by Justice O'Connor's ear-
lier dictum in Midkiff that the power of eminent domain and the po-
lice power were coterminous. As Justice Thomas points out in his
separate dissent, this statement is misleading because it overlooks that
when government acts under the police power by regulation to abate
a true nuisance, it has no obligation to make compensation.5 7 True
enough, Justice O'Connor concedes, but harm-prevention is not ir-
relevant to the scope of the eminent domain power.18 Where the
scope of public use exceeds either actual ownership or use by the
public, some harmful activity must be the source of its justification.
To de-couple these broader, more intrusive condemnations from
harmful property use would be to
significantly expand[] the meaning of public use[, and allow] the sover-
eign [to] take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and
give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is pre-
dicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public-such as in-
creased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure.59
The Takings Clause has frequently been identified with prevent-
ing some persons from bearing burdens that are more appropriately
borne by the community as a whole. The public use inquiry outlined
by the dissent is a corollary. It prevents the friends of the legislature
from imposing disproportionate burdens on the less advantaged or
politically active. Having suffered the sting of the "urban renewal"
bulldozer, minority and low-income families have special reason to be
apprehensive.60
Before concluding this introductory discussion of Kelo and the
meaning of the public use limitation on the Takings Clause, refer-
ence should be made to Justice Thomas's separate dissent since it il-
lustrates the difference between constitutional interpretation an-
chored in original meaning and the majority's more precedent-
centered method. Thomas's approach is quite reminiscent of Chief
Justice Marshall's famous exposition of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland.6 Thomas illustrates, as Marshall did
before him, how each phrase in the Constitution is intended to con-
vey meaning and how the parts-both granting and limiting power-
56 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) ("The 'public use' requirement is
thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.").
57 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2685 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Traditional uses of that regulatory
power.., required no compensation... in sharp contrast to the takings power....").
See id. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that eliminating a public harm is a le-
gitimate public purpose, regardless of the property's ultimate use).
59 Id. at 2675.
60 See id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the subjective value of public projects
like urban renewal initiatives).
61 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324-25 (1819) (parsing the Necessary and Proper Clause to
advocate a deferential judicial approach to government action).
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must be construed as a whole in order to correctly reach constitu-
tional resolution.
62
Take, for example, Thomas's separate consideration of the some-
what different eminent domain authority of the federal and state
governments.3 This authority differs by virtue of the intrinsic differ-
ences of these governments-the federal government being one of
enumerated power; the state governments possessing reserved power
of a more general nature.64 Thus, for a federal condemnation to be
legitimate, it must have an anchor in an enumerated power other
than the Takings Clause, which Thomas very effectively points out, is
not a grant but a limitation upon federal power.6' On the federal
level, then, employing condemnation must always be ancillary to, or
in support of, a federal power and any federal taking therefore always
requires justification in relation to an enumerated public purpose.
By these means, Thomas illustrates how the public use inquiry cannot
merely be redundant of the inquiry into whether a proper public
purpose exists. That would turn part of the constitutional text into
66surplusage.
Turning to the state level from which Kelo arose, the Takings
Clause is ajudicially incorporated federal limit on a state's more gen-
eral power to condemn as an aspect of reserved sovereignty. Here is
where an interesting historical symbiosis occurs and is overlooked
when decisions are made based on precedent alone. Thomas ob-
serves how colonial and early state uses of eminent domain do not
support a broad understanding of public use, how those early prac-
tices inform the meaning of public use in the Takings Clause, and
how, as subsequently incorporated, that limit upon power must now
be observed.67
This early state practice confirms that eminent domain supplied
what economists term "public goods"-property that is jointly con-
sumed and not subject to a practicable right to exclude-such as pub-
lic roads and parks.m There was also, as Thomas recounts, a consid-
erable practice of using condemnation for so-called Mill Acts, which
authorized the owners of mills to flood upstream owners, but here
the upstream owner was both compensated and the mills were regu-
lated by law and compelled to serve the public "for a stipulated toll
62 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2678-81 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
63 Id. at 2685.
rA Id.
See id. (arguing that the federal government's enumerated powers limit its Fifth Amend-
ment authority to take private property).
66 Id. at 2686.
67 Id. at 2680-82.
68 See id. at 2681 ("States employed the eminent domain power to provide quintessentially
public goods, such as public roads, toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public parks.").
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and in regular order .... In essence, mills were public utilities.
"These were 'public uses' in the fullest sense of the word, because the
public could legally use and benefit from them equally.,
70
Thomas concedes that some early state legislatures wandered past
these limits on occasion for private roads, though, even here, there
were often associated public-use obligations.71 In any event, it is
Thomas's argument that legislative aberration is not the principle
upon which constitutional interpretation should be governed.72
Moreover, nothing in the history is persuasively overcome by prece-
dent for Thomas. Turning to the principal nineteenth-century case
relied upon by Justice Stevens, Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,73
Justice Thomas reveals that the issue in Bradley was whether a con-
demnation for purposes of constructing an irrigation ditch was for a
public use.74 Justice Thomas concedes that Justice Peckham declared
for the Court that a public use existed because " [t o irrigate, and thus
to bring into possible cultivation these large masses of otherwise
worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of
public interest, not confined to landowners, or even to any one sec-
tion of the State."75 But the statement was dictum. 76 As with the Mill
Acts, the public was given a right to use the irrigation ditch for "a
proportionate share of the water," and as a matter of original mean-
ing that is what matters.77 That Justice Peckham thought irrigation
good policy or of high utility was his personal opinion, nothing more.
Thomas makes a good case that Berman and Midkiff strayed from
constitutional principle, and Kelojust took us further down the errant
path-but in a way that finally and literally hit home. Professor
Merrill questions Justice Thomas's history, suggesting that given the
placement of the word "without" in the Fifth Amendment as a modi-
fier of just compensation, public use may not be a limitation at all.78
69 Id. (quotingJ. LEWIs, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 178, at 246 & n.3 (1888)).
70 Id.
71 See id. ("Some States enacted statutes allowing the taking of property for the purpose of
building private roads [but, of those States,] some required the private landowner to keep the
road open to the public...
72 Id. at 2682.
73 164 U.S. 112, 112 (1896).
74 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
75 Bradley, 164 U.S. at 161.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 162.
78 Professor Merrill testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 20, 2005,
observing: "Moreover, for all his parsing of old dictionary definitions, Justice Thomas never
explained why the prohibitory word 'without' is placed before 'just compensation' rather than
before 'public use'-a piece of textual evidence that seems to cut against the thesis that the
Clause imposes a public use requirement." The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and
Other Private Property Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Kelo
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In a recent law review article,Justice Stevens apparently is of the same
mind.79 With all due respect, such fine lawyerly speculation is more
likely to enrage than satisfy homeowners threatened with eminent
domain. That it had been previously observed that the Takings
Clause conditioned government action on the payment of compensa-
tion seems hardly a direct holding that the words "public use" are not
also a limitation.0 Likewise, the public reaction to Kelo suggests that
they do not share Professor Merrill's understanding that the Framers
may have indulged the notion that "property owner[s gave] construc-
tive consent to the taking (of their property by their] representation
in [the legislature] .,,81 This is all rather high-hat for folks of modest
income just trying to live their lives in peace. Indeed, it is reminis-
cent of the argument of the development corporation in Kelo, itself,
which noted rather coolly that eminent domain always forces some
people to bear a burden that is not borne by all: "[I]n every instance
that it is used, the power of eminent domain places a greater burden
on certain individuals than society at large-this is true for roads,
schools, prisons, all of the 'traditional' public uses lauded by the
[homeowners] .,,8
Yet, over-wrought legalism or questionable historical interpreta-
tion aside, the development corporation does score a valid point in
noting that behind its corporate moniker are people who have a
dream for reversing the declining prospects of their city.83 So too,
Pfizer may well wonder why it is not lauded, rather than chastised, for
making a sizeable investment where others have shown only disinter-
est. There are indeed two competing goods in a case like Kelo: that
of family homes and a good faith effort to spark renewed urban pros-
Hearing] (statement of Thomas A. Merrill, Professor, Columbia University), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1612&wit-id=4661.
79 John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1561, 1567 (2006) ("[A] purely
literal reading of the Takings Clause would limit its coverage to a guarantee of just compensa-
tion.").
But see id. at 1566. Stevens thinks otherwise, writing, "As Justice O'Connor explained in
her Linge opinion, that text does not prohibit any taking of private property, but instead merely
places a condition on the exercise of the takings power." That is of course correct, but again,
the words "public use" have long been given constitutional significance. Consider, for example,
Justice Brennan's observation in the regulatory taking context where he notes that
where a police power regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare so that there may be no "public use,".. . the landowner
may nevertheless have a damages cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a Four-
teenth Amendment due process violation.
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan,J., dissent-
ing).
81 Kelo Hearing, supra note 78.
82 Brief of the Respondents at 41, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No.
04-108).
83 Id. at 42.
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perity. The development corporation in Kelo and sympathetic schol-
ars like Professor Merrill make an attractive case for taking affirmative
steps to renew a community in distress. Yet, one has to ask if there is
a community to be saved, in a human sense, if the families that in-
habit it are displaced by force.
Scott Bullock and the Institute for Justice make a good case that
condemnation of non-blighted private homes ought to be off-limits.
Professor Merrill is less enthusiastic about such a prohibition, prefer-
ring instead a reform that would augment compensation beyond fair
market value for a family home. This focus on family and home post-
Kelo is salutary. The frequent repetition of the adage that a "man's
house is his castle" makes it abundantly clear that in English common
law as in the United States "the freedom of one's house" is one of the
most vital elements of liberty. Arguably, this consideration has been
of influence to the modern court in the evaluation of a wide variety of
individual right claims, from sexual practices84 to Fourth Amendment
protectionss  to the assertion of free speech.86 Judge Cooley observed
that "[t]he maxim that 'every man's house is his castle,' is made a
part of our constitutional law ... and has always been looked upon as
of high value to the citizen. ,'7 It would seem that this value remains
high enough to permit a legislative re-thinking of forms of condem-
nation that teeter on the line of public/private use.
84 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003) (extending the historical freedom
"from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places" to consen-
sual same-sex relationships); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (applying
"the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life" to state intrusion into the marital rela-
tionship).
85 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) ("[A] man's house [is] his castle and
not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.").
86 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (citing the "special respect for individ-
ual liberty in the home [that] has long been part of our culture and our law" in opposing a
regulation of signs on residential property).
87 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 425-26 (1868).
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MR. RICHARD STENGEL: Good evening. I am Richard Stengel,
President and CEO of the National Constitution Center. And I want
to welcome you here and to the Fourth Annual Templeton Lecture
on Economic Liberty and the Constitution.
You will hear a great deal tonight about eminent domain and Kelo
v. New London. Surely the case illustrates that the Constitution, and
its interpretation, is far from being a dry, dusty, arcane, obscure
document. It is in fact a document that affects literally-as we will
hear tonight-where we live. It affects our daily lives from the mo-
ment we wake up in the morning to when we go to sleep at night. At
the National Constitution Center, we illustrate the abiding impor-
tance of the Constitution in our lives to the hundreds of thousands of
visitors a year that we welcome.
The Templeton Lecture is an important part of the National Con-
stitution Center's efforts. Dr. Templeton had the vision to realize, as
a doctor helping children for so many years, that the health of Amer-
ica is not just in our hearts and lungs, but in our minds and our spir-
its. And that we need to sustain each.... We are very, very grateful
for Dr. Templeton's sponsorship of this lecture.
We had a wonderful Moot Court exercise just before this lecture
with some fabulous students from Temple and the University of
Pennsylvania, and it was presided over by Professor Doug Kmiec, who
I think of as the tenth Justice. More than that, he was one of the
founders of the National Constitution Center, and he continues to
guide us to this day. Please join me in welcoming Dr. Templeton and
in thanking him for his endowment of this important lecture series.
DR. JOHN TEMPLETON: I welcome all of you to the Fourth Annual
Templeton Lecture on Economic Liberty and the Constitution. The
goal of this important lecture program is, as President Stengel noted,
to shine a spotlight on the economic liberties that are addressed in
our U.S. Constitution. Because of these constitutional rights and pro-
tections, the energy and power of Americans' economic engine has
changed the world for the better. Three centuries of American en-
trepreneurship, creativity, prosperity are directly related to the en-
hancement and protection of personal property rights.
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The subject of economic liberty and the Constitution is not an ab-
stract matter relating to some finer points of constitutional law. This
subject needs to be reviewed through the prism and question of
"what is justice?" The Constitution was made not just for the state
and not just for persons of privilege. It was made for the people as a
whole. It was built on the revolutionary concept that a citizen's po-
litical and economic rights would be preserved and enhanced by a
system of laws whose authority lay in a contract with the people.
The Founding Fathers of our country were dedicated to the con-
cept that without the primacy of the voice of the people, the trust on
which our fragile experiment in representative democracy is based
would be so undermined that this experiment could not survive.
Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1816 that the protection of such rights is
the first principle of association, the guarantee to everyone of the
free exercise of his industry and the fruits acquired of it.
The father of the U.S. Constitution, to which this Center is dedi-
cated, was James Madison. In The Federalist Paper 45 he said, "The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal gov-
ernment are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state
governments are numerous and indefinite."88 In that regard, in our
discussions this evening it is worth recalling the words of Justice Ste-
vens, who wrote for the majority opinion in the Kelo Case: "We em-
phasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any state from placing
further restrictions on its exercise of takings power."8 9
This lecture program is intended to explore the implied and spe-
cific economic liberties which motivated those early leaders in Amer-
ica, who fought first to achieve our independence, and then who, in a
compact with the people, wrote our Constitution.
In regard to the subject of economic liberties and the Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court actually gave this lecture program a gift
when it issued its decision in Kelo v. New London. Though many
would argue whether or not it was a gift in other ways. The Kelo deci-
sion proactively makes the case that all of us must keep our eye on
the economic liberties that are explicit and implicit in the Constitu-
tion.
I want to thank the National Constitution Center, its president
Rick Stengel, for their leadership, and especially, for the special at-
tention given to this particular lecture. One of the innovations of
President Stengel this year was the initiation of the great debate on
the lecture topic that took place earlier today between law students of
the University of Pennsylvania and Temple University. This very
penetrating debate mirrored the arguments which took place before
88 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
89 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
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the Supreme Court last year. I want to recognize in particular the
four students who worked so hard to turn this debate into a reality.
These students are Kyle Mach and Jeffrey Nessler at Penn, and
Marian Brossia and Justin O'Shaun of Temple. Because we are so
grateful for your excellent efforts today, please stand and accept our
applause.
More than the main lecture has been arranged this year. New fea-
tures put in place by the team at the National Constitution Center in-
clude an innovative tool kit for teachers to lead a classroom discus-
sion on the subject of eminent domain. This program teaches
students about the power of government and the power of citizens to
challenge the actions of government. Through technology, the citi-
zens of New London, including the students of Mitchell College lo-
cated there, will be able to experience the lecture live. And we shall
be hearing from them later in our question and answer period.
Finally, I have the pleasure to introduce the moderator and guid-
ing force for this lecture series, Professor Douglas
Kmiec.... Professor Kmiec has worked very hard to refine the struc-
ture of this program to make it more engaging and exciting, as if the
subject that we will hear about tonight is not already exciting enough.
Therefore please join me in welcoming Professor Douglas Kmiec.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Good evening ladies and gentlemen. Thank
you Dr. Templeton for those very kind words of introduction. Thank
you Rick Stengel for your very kind words as well. It's a delight to be
the tenth Justice, though I wouldn't mind being the ninth. But it's a
delight to be here as well.
I am especially grateful to Dr. Templeton for his endowment of
the Templeton Lecture on Economic Liberties for the National Con-
stitution Center. And indeed there have been many excellent and
scholarly presentations as a part of this program. We began with a
debate between Yale's Bruce Ackerman and Pepperdine's Kenneth
Starr. We then proceeded to draw upon the talents of Richard Ep-
stein of the University of Chicago and had those responded to by the
former Acting Solicitor General of the United States Walter
Dellinger. Last year we had the brilliant constitutionalist Cass Sun-
stein responded to by Dr. Walter Williams, a very provocative and ac-
complished economist from George Mason. And tonight we have a
splendid program as well.
Indeed, tonight's program is not just of scholarly importance, it
is-as Dr. Templeton indicates and as those gathered at Mitchell Col-
lege know only too well-of great personal and cultural significance.
Because it does touch on home and family, the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Kelo v. City of New London was tangibly and deeply felt. We
are very privileged to have those who experienced it firsthand with us
tonight. And I want to thank Mitchell College and for arranging for
the technology to bring Philadelphia and New London together. We
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are especially privileged because the named petitioner in Kelo v. City
of New London, Nurse Susette Kelo, is in the audience at Mitchell Col-
lege. It was her restored waterfront Victorian home that became the
centerpiece of the Court's attention in this case.
In Kelo, the Supreme Court ruled five to four that private property
could be taken for economic redevelopment. To say the least, the
decision has stirred a national uproar, but the decision is not without
its defenders. I am inclined not to be one of them. That is a disclo-
sure, by the way, that few discussion leaders seem candid enough to
provide. Nevertheless, as moderator, I intend to put tough questions
to both sides this evening, as illustrated in the moot court with the
students this afternoon. Because of my own scholarly skepticism of
the Kelo result, however, it was important to me that we find the most
able scholar in the land to make the strongest arguments in favor of
the Kelo outcome. We succeeded.
Our respondent tonight is superbly qualified to defend the Su-
preme Court's decision. Professor Thomas Merrill, who is our re-
spondent, is presently the Beekman Professor of Law at Columbia.
He was formerly the Deputy Solicitor General of the United States,
and for many years before going to Columbia, served as the John Paul
Stevens Professor of Constitutional Law at Northwestern. As Profes-
sor Merrill points out himself, there's a bit of an irony in that since
Justice Stevens is the author of the majority opinion in Kelo v. New
London. I'm absolutely certain that the long-held honor of being
Northwestern's Stevens Professor did not require Professor Merrill to
take the position in defense. Instead, I anticipate that he will very
carefully and thoroughly expand on testimony he delivered to the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee that the opinion in Kelo is an exten-
sion of precedent and history and perhaps is justifiable as well as a
matter of policy and economic efficiency. But I will let him speak for
himself in due time.
Our principal presenter tonight, of course, sees matters quite dif-
ferently. And it's not surprising that he does. Our principal pre-
senter is Scott Bullock, the senior litigation attorney for the Institute
for Justice in Washington, D.C. The Institute for Justice has been
committed in numerous ways to the cause of economic freedom and
economic liberty. And it was not surprising that they readily took up
the advocacy on behalf of Susette Kelo and her neighbors before the
Supreme Court of the United States. This is a return home for Scott
Bullock; he is a native of Pennsylvania. A graduate of Pitt, Mr. Bul-
lock's argument can be quite straightforward-at least in a textual
sense-because he has the benefit of the fact that the words "public
use," of course, do not say "private use." Yet, in light of judicial con-
struction, more will be needed to meet his burden. I suspect that we
will hear from counselor Bullock that if a handful of earlier cases
held to the contrary, that they were in all likelihood mistaken.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Why mistaken? Again, anticipating somewhat, Mr. Bullock's advo-
cacy may reference the 1795 case of Van Home's Lessee v. DorranceY9
There, Justice Patterson, riding circuit for the Supreme Court, char-
acterized the power of eminent domain as the despotic power, writ-
ing, and I quote, "That the despotic power.., of taking private prop-
erty.., exists in every government. ..."9' However, it is not to be
"call[ed] into exercise except in urgent cases, or cases of the first ne-
cessity." 9'
With that as an introduction, let me invite Mr. Bullock to this po-
dium.
BULLOCK: Thank you very much. It is truly an honor to be able to
speak today at the National Constitution Center. And thank you to
Tony Green for setting this up and to Doug Kmiec for moderating
this discussion, for your kind introduction, and for your friendship
over many years.
As you are aware, the Court in Kelo held for the first time that pri-
vate economic development alone was a public use under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.! This astonished most people
throughout the country. And I think it is fair to say that the Kelo deci-
sion is the most universally despised Supreme Court decision in re-
cent memory.94 Most people cannot believe that the Supreme Court
would sign off on allowing the government to take your home, your
small business, or your church and give it to Wal-Mart, or give it to a
shopping mall, or give it to a builder of private condominiums. But
that is happening here in Pennsylvania,9' and it is happening
throughout the country. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor perhaps best
put it in her dissent where she said that as a result of the majority
opinion in Kelo, "[t]he specter of condemnation hangs over all prop-
erty. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with
a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a fac-
tory. 96 These are not hypothetical cases; they are happening. They
happened before the Kelo case and they are certainly happening in
the wake of the Kelo decision as well.
90 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795).
91 Id. at 311.
92 Id.
93 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 ("[T]he City's proposed condemnations [for private development]
are for a 'public use' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment....").
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case Won On Appeal (To Public), N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, § 4, at 19
(documenting public outcry in response to the decision).
95 See Elisa Ung, Eminent Domain's Virulent Backlash: A Year After a Landmark US. Ruling, the
Assembly Passed a Restriction Bill: Critics Say it Does Not Go Far Enough, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
June 23, 2006, at B1 (analyzing state laws protecting property owners from private-use takings).
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676.
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Just one quick example here locally. In Ardmore, Pennsylvania
the government seeks to take small businesses to give to private de-
velopers to put in higher tax-producing businesses. That is the
equivalent of taking a Motel 6 for a Ritz Carlton. Just up the road
here on Interstate 95 in New Jersey, the City of Long Branch pro-
poses to take small beach-front cottages in order to build high-end
multi-million dollar condominiums.98 Here, the government is taking
homes for homes, homes of poorer folks to build for wealthier indi-
viduals. We have documented in a five-year period alone over 10,000
examples of private to private takings of property throughout the
country. This is a very real problem that is happening in this coun-
try.
Before talking about the post-Kelo world and some very interesting
and I think some very promising developments as a result of the Su-
preme Court's decision, I want to step back for a moment, especially
since we have the audience here from New London, and talk a little
bit about some of the particulars of the New London case and the
Kelo decision itself. And, to focus in particular on the three things
that I think really are what the eminent domain battle is all about.
First, there was a very important legal issue in the Kelo case. Second,
there were some very passionate and dedicated and yet beleaguered
private property owners. And third, there was horrible abuse of
power by the hands of the government.
First, the legal issue. As I mentioned, for the first time the Su-
preme Court in Kelo ruled that private economic development alone
could be a public use under the Fifth Amendment. New London was
not taking this property for a traditional public use like a road or a
bridge or a reservoir. It was not even claiming that this was a blighted
neighborhood that justified the use of eminent domain. They were
taking it simply because the City of New London was struggling eco-
nomically, and they hoped that the new development would produce
more tax revenue, produce more jobs, and improve the general
economy of the City of New London.'00 We knew that this justifica-
tion for the use of eminent domain had to be challenged. It is a vi-
sion of eminent domain without any limitation. Every home would
produce more tax revenue and jobs if it were a business. Every
97 See Ung, supra note 95, at B6 (describing the Ardmore plan, which called for the taking
and demolition of ten buildings that housed businesses).
98 See Sean Flynn, Will the Government Take Your Home, PARADE MAGAZINE, Aug. 6, 2006, at 6
(discussing the city's attempt to take family-owned bungalows for expensive development pro-
jects).
99 See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN 2 (2003) (cataloguing takings in the
United States between 1998 and 2002).
100 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658-59 (citing decades of economic decline and subsequent initia-
tives to revitalize).
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smaller business would produce more jobs and more tax revenues, at
least theoretically, if it were a larger business. So this justification
really does place every home and every piece of property at risk of be-
ing taken for takings for private economic development.
Second, the New London case had a wonderful and very dedi-
cated set of property owners that was determined to fight, not only
for their own homes, but as the struggle continued they realized that
they were fighting for the rights of all Americans. Susette Kelo is a
special person. She is a person who was determined to stick up for
her own rights and to try to change the law and to try to change the
world in the process. She found her dream home in 1997 along the
river front in New London, and Mrs. Kelo worked very hard in order
to obtain that home. She's a registered nurse; she worked three jobs
in order to pay for this house. She's now down to two jobs because
she claims that fighting eminent domain abuse is virtually a full-time
job in and of itselff."
°
Another one of the property owners was Wilhelmina Dery. She
was born in her home in 1918. She had never lived anywhere else,
and her family had owned property in the Fort Trumbull neighbor-
hood for over one hundred years. She had lived in that house with
her husband for sixty years. Her son and his family lived next door."°2
And the other homeowners there were also special people who were
dedicated to trying to protect their rights and to save their homes.
Third, what we saw in New London was a terrible abuse of power.
It was an all-too-typical example of the government being able to
abuse its power even if it was technically following the law and follow-
ing the statutory requirements set up by Connecticut. For instance,
in some of the first meetings that the property owners had with real
estate agents in the City of New London, they were told that if they
did not sell their property, the government was going to be able to
take it from them throu h eminent domain. There were threats
from the very beginning.
0
Another thing that the New London Development Corporation
did in the area is that, when they obtained properties through volun-
tary purchase, they immediately tore down the homes. 0 4 If you've
seen pictures of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood, you'll see the
pockmarked nature of the neighborhood right now. That is because
the NLDC decided to immediately tear down the homes there. I be-
101 Melanie Kirkpatrick, Editorial, Home for Christmas, WALL ST.J., Dec. 24, 2005, at A8.
102 Iver Peterson, As Land Goes to Revitalization, There Go the Old Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2005, § 1, at 29.
103 See Laura Mansnerus, Refusing to Let Go, Property Owners Test Eminent Domain's Limits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2001, at BI (describing New London's initial efforts to purchase homes).
104 Ryan D'Agostino, Where the Streets Have No Name, 34 MONEY, Dec. 1, 2005, at 138-46.
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lieve that was to send a not-so-subtle message to the people who were
fighting this that their homes would be next.
They also refused to let the people who are truly dedicated to
fighting this battle and wanted to keep their homes keep their
homes. The total property area in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood
of the people that were fighting this constituted 1.54 acres of prop-
erty in a ninety-acre project area.15 It would have been very easy, and
it still would be very easy, to incorporate those existing homes and to
allow the development project to move forward. At the time of the
takings, when we got involved in this case, the New London Devel-
opment Corporation was headed by a person by the name of Claire
Gaudiani, who was then the president of Connecticut College.'06 And
she justified the takings in New London and what she was doing with
the use of eminent domain by saying that everything that happened
to this country that is great is because someone "left skin on the side-
walk."' °7 That was her justification for her use of eminent domain.
Also at the time, Governor John Rowland of Connecticut was a
major backer of the project, and he used his clout to both fund the
project and to push forward with the development plans in this
area.'08 So there were some very very powerful adversaries on the
other side of this battle. The case was a rollercoaster ride. The prop-
erty owners mostly won at the trial court level. The Connecticut Su-
preme Court ruled against the property owners by a four to three
vote.' °9 Of course, we and the Fort Trumbull homeowners were
elated when the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take on the case.
Then the Supreme Court ruled against the Fort Trumbull folks by,
again, the narrowest of possible margins, five to four. 0
I'd like to talk just very briefly about the Kelo decision itself before
talking about the aftermath of Kelo.
First of all, the majority opinion in the Kelo case was very im-
pressed by the planning process that the City of New London went
through: that the City of New London had public hearings; that they
produced a planning document that was several inches thick; that
they put together a municipal development plan. The majority
M5 See Charles Lane, Justices Affirm Property Seizures: 5-4 Ruling Backs Forced Sales for Private De-
velopment, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at Al.
106 See David M. Herszenhorn, Residents of New London Go to Court, Saying Project Puts Profit Be-
fore Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at B5.107
Laura Mansnerus, All Politics is Local, and Sadly, Sometimes Personal, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005,
at 14CN.
IN See Lou Cannon, The Revolt of the States, 14 STATE NET CAP.J. 2, 3 (2006) (documenting the
governor's grant of $73 million to the New London Development Corp.).
See id. (detailing Kelo's procedural history).
11o See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2699 (2005).
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seemed to think that this was some type of check on eminent domain
abuse.l1
Well, I think that what this demonstrates is the majority's discon-
nect from how these cases really play out in the real world. We did
the New London case and we've been involved in scores of these
cases throughout the country. And I can tell you that there is always a
development plan. There is always some type of plan and some hear-
ings. So this is really no effective check upon eminent domain abuse
whatsoever.
The majority opinion also had a very benign view of the planning
process itself, where I think they thought that all parties that were
able to participate in the public hearings views were given equal
weight. Where Susette Kelo's, who testified before the various bodies,
opinion was equally important to the Pfizer Corporation who stated
its views as to what it thought should go into the development plan. I
believe that is quite a naive view of how these projects often shake
out. And, I think what happened in New London exemplifies that
very well.
In Fort Trumbull's plan, Pfizer wanted a five-star luxury hotel, up-
scale condominiums for its short-term employees, and private office
space for its subcontractors. At the end of the day and after all the
hearings, the municipal development plan contained a five-star lux-
ury hotel, private upscale condominiums and private office space" 2-
exactly what Pfizer wanted in the municipal development plan.
The Supreme Court majority opinion also said that there was no
specific evidence in this case that the city was doing this simply to
benefit a private party, whether it be Pfizer or some other private
party in this case.' 13 But there are two problems with this notion.
One, it's very difficult to know what truly motivates government offi-
cials for their actions. Unless you have a smoking gun email or a
breakdown on the witness stand, how do you really know what is in
somebody's heart of hearts as to their true motivations for doing
something? But even more importantly, if you say that the trickle-
down of benefits of private economic development in the form of
higher taxes and more jobs are now public uses, it's virtually impossi-
ble to separate out public benefits and private uses. Yes, the City of
New London was not doing this because they were Pfizer stockhold-
ers or they simply wanted to benefit Pfizer. But their attitude, I think
it's fair to say, is "what is good for Pfizer is good for the City of New
i See id. at 2665 ("Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings
challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.").
12 Id. at 2659.
11 See id. at 2661-62 (citing lower court findings to the effect that "the City's development
plan was not adopted to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals").
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London." And indeed the only way that the public can benefit from
the higher taxes and more jobs is if the private business is successful.
So therefore, of course, you want to give as many benefits as possible
to the private party. That is why, as Justice O'Connor said, holding
that private economic development is a public use really demolishes
the distinction between public and private use."4 And, I think that
that is certainly true as a result of the Kelo decision.
What has been happening in the wake of the Kelo decision has
really been quite extraordinary. As I said, I think it is fair to say that
the Kelo case has been subjected to almost universal condemnation by
most people throughout the country."5 I think the highlight of the
Supreme Court's majority opinion is Justice Stevens's recognition
that state courts are still free to recognize greater protections for
home and small business owners under their own state constitu-
tions."6 And that is a very important facet to this decision. And even
more importantly, the trend in the state courts has been favorable.
Many state courts, after years of neglect and giving very little protec-
tion to homes and small business owners, are moving in the direction
of recognizing greater protections for home and small business own-
ers. And,Justice Stevens almost invited them to continue that trend.
One case we are litigating, that will be one to watch, is in the Su-
preme Court of Ohio." The Supreme Court of Ohio has an eminent
domain abuse case where the court is faced with a very stark choice.
It can take the route that the Supreme Court did in the Kelo case, and
give very little, if any, protection to home and small business owners.
Or, it can protect home and small business owners to a greater de-.• 118
gree under its own state constitution.
The legislative response to the Kelo case has also been quite en-
couraging. So far, forty-seven states have either introduced legisla-
tion or have passed legislation that seeks to change their state's emi-
nent domain laws."9 Eight states so far have passed legislation,'20 and
114 Id. at 2671 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
' See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 94 ("The decision provoked outrage from Democrats and Re-
publicans, liberals and libertarians, and everyone betwixt and between.").
16 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668 (majority opinion) (limiting the Court's opinion to "public use"
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
17 See Norwood v. Homey, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1120 (Ohio 2006) (limiting the city of Nor-
wood's attempt to utilize eminent domain powers for economic development efforts).
118 The Ohio Supreme Court decided the Norwood case on July 26, 2006, finding the city's
economically-motivated eminent domain efforts unconstitutional: "[T]he fact that the appro-
priation would provide an economic benefit to the government and community, standing
alone, does not satisfy the public-use requirement" of the Ohio Constitution. Id.119
See Elizabeth Mehren, States Acting to Protect Private Property, L.A. TIMES, April 16, 2006, at
Al (noting the dramatic bipartisan response in favor of preserving homeowners' rights).
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I would say about half of those are really solid eminent domain re-
form. The other four are steps in the right direction, but much more
needs to be done.
I think what is also interesting about this issue is that it cuts across
the divides that you typically see in America today. This is truly an is-
sue that unites people across geographic divides, and unites people
across ideological divides as well. Any poll on this issue demonstrates
that. I think one of the best ways of looking at this in the political
realm is what happened in the U.S. Congress in the wake of the Kelo
case. The first person to denounce the Kelo case and say something
ought to be done at the federal level, in the U.S. Senate, was Senator
John Cornyn, a conservative Republican from Texas,12 1 good friends
with President Bush. One of the first persons to denounce the Kelo
decision in the U.S. House of Representatives was Maxine Waters,
22
generally considered to be one of the most liberal, if not the most lib-
eral member of Congress. Two people on absolute opposite sides of
the ideological spectrum, but still coming to the same conclusion
about the abuse of eminent domain. And, of course, the U.S. House
of Representatives has acted in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion
to deny all federal economic development funds to government
agencies for two years if they use eminent domain for private eco-
nomic development. 22 That passed the House of Representatives by
a vote of 376 to 38.124 That bill is now, not surprisingly, facing a much
more difficult fight in the United States Senate.
Now, if you would look at this issue and look at the polling on this,
you would think that the legislation would pass overwhelmingly, and
it would be actually a rather easy legislative battle. That is not the
case. I've often said, and I think it's only a slight exaggeration, that
the only people who defend eminent domain abuse are those who
stand to benefit from it. Namely, city officials, planners and develop-
ers. I guess there are a few academics that also fall into that category,
and some editorial pages, like the editorial page of the New York
120 The number of states that have passed laws to change eminent domain is now thirty. See
Lynne Tuohy, A Vow to Keep the "Fort": Families Hold Rally, Seek Rell's Aid in Eminent Domain Case,
HARTFORD COURANT, May 23, 2006, at Al.
121 Mike Allen & Charles Babington, House Votes to Undercut High Court on Property, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2005, at Al.
122 See id. (noting that Rep. Waters cosponsored a bipartisan bill to deny federal funds to any
city or state project that forces people out of homes for profit-making projects).
123 See Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128,109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005)
(denying federal funds to government organizations who utilize eminent domain powers for
economic development).
124 Kenneth R. Harney, On Capitol Hill, A Move to Curb Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
2005, at F1.
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Times;12 5 however, the New York Times's new headquarters are being
built on land taken through eminent domain.126 So, I think they
would have to fall into the category that Ijust mentioned.
But, what these supporters of eminent domain for private devel-
opment lack in numbers they more than make up for in their politi-
cal clout and influence. City officials and mayors and developers walk
the halls of every state legislature, they know how the legislative proc-
ess works, and your typical home and small business owner does not
have a very strong voice in their state capitals. So these legislative ef-
forts are turning into huge battles. This is also true in the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania as well, where there is an effort underway to
change the state's eminent domain laws.2 2 That effort is still ongo-
ing, but so far the cities of Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have been
able to carve out seven-year exemptions for themselves from any
changes to the state's eminent domain laws.
28
I just want to close briefly with a comment about what is happen-
ing in New London with the people who started this effort. Ms.
Gaudiani, whom I mentioned previously, was the head of the New
London Development Corporation and the President of Connecticut
College, was forced to resign from Connecticut College when over
75% of the faculty demanded her resignation.2 9 She is no longer the
head of the NLDC, and I believe that she is a research fellow some-
where [New York University] where she is not involved in the use of
eminent domain. 13°
Governor Rowland, as you might be aware, apparently was a little
bit too close to contractors and developers and just finished up
spending a year in the federal penitentiary here in Pennsylvania. 3 '
And where are the homeowners of Fort Trumbull? They're where
they've always been. They're in their homes. And that's where we
hope to keep them. There's an effort underway in Connecticut to try
to save the homeowners and preserve the homes of the people who
have fought this development scheme for the past seven years. The
1 See, e.g., Editorial, The Limits of Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005, at A22 (arguing
thatJustice O'Connor's "fears are exaggerated").
126 See Editorial, Responsible Use of Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2006, at A18 (recog-
nizing the paper's particular benefit from a government taking).
127
See Press Release, Institute for Justice, Pennsylvania Senate Passes Eminent Domain Re-
form (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.ij.org/private-property/castle/12_7_05pr.html
(describing the Pennsylvania Senate's passage of a bill to prohibit eminent domain use for
commercial purposes).
128 See id. (denouncing the exception provided to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh).
129 SeeJane Ellen Dee, Oh, Claire: You're a Scholar and Visionary... If Only You Could Quit Leav-
ingSkin On the Sidewalk, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at 5.
130 Jane E. Dee, Standoff at Fort Trumbull, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 24, 2002, at 13.
131 William Yardley & Stacey Stowe, A Contrite Rowland Gets a Year for Accepting $107,000 in
Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at Al.
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new governor of Connecticut, Governor M. Jodi Rell, who is trying to
clean up after the term of Governor Rowland, has come out against
the Supreme Court's decision in the Kelo case. 3 2 She said that the use
of eminent domain in Fort Trumbull was "not defensible.' 33 She has
called on the city and New London Development Corporation to
have a moratorium on eminent domain there and throughout the
state until the legislature considers changing its laws. 134 And she said
she supports a solution to keep Susette Kelo and any other home-
owners who want to keep their homes in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood. 5 And we hope that that happens.
136
I'm sad to say that Mrs. Dery-Wilhelmina Dery-passed away last
month at the age of 88 years old. 37 But I'm also very proud to say
that Mrs. Dery was able to spend her last days and actually did pass
away in her home. 3 ' She passed away just a few feet from where she
was born in 1918. And we hope to keep the other property owners in
Fort Trumbull in their homes. We will also continue to press to keep
home and small business owners in their homes throughout the
country. And we will try to turn what was a very bad decision in the
Kelo case into the high water mark of eminent domain abuse in this
country.
Thank you very much.
KMIEC: We now turn to a response by Professor Thomas Merrill.
As we do, let me also remind this large audience here in the Annen-
berg Auditorium or at Mitchell College that we want to hear from
you. On the cards provided, please submit a question either to Mr.
Bullock or Professor Merrill or to them both. So now the response,
Professor Thomas Merrill of the Columbia Law School. Professor
Merrill.
MERRILL: Thanks very much Doug, and thanks again to the or-
ganizers for inviting me. It's always difficult to follow Scott on this
topic because Scott has absolutely no doubt about what he thinks
about the whole issue of eminent domain, in particular in the context
of economic development.
1 See Kenneth R. Harney, Eminent Domain Ruling Has Strong Repercussions, WASH. POST, July
23, 2005, at F1 (discussing Governor Rell's claim that Kelo is "the 21st century equivalent of the
Boston Tea Party").
133 Stacey Stowe, On Eminent Domain, Many Shifting Stances, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at B3.
im See Harney, supra note 132.
135 Editorial, New London's Chance to Heal, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 19, 2005, at A8.
13 The New London City Council rejected Governor Rell's call to return title to the property
owners and voted to evict the residents. Susette Kelo will be able to keep her house and it will
be moved outside of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood. The Cristofaro family, although they
will lose their current home, have a right to purchase any new home that is built in Fort Trum-
bull at a fixed price.
137 Lynne Tuohy, Fort Trumbull Plaintiff Dies, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 15, 2006, at B1.
138 Id.
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My own thinking on the subject seems to be in a state of constant
evolution. Maybe this makes it difficult for Scott to follow me, but for
different reasons than my difficulties in following him. One thing I
am relatively confident about is that the Supreme Court got it right in
Kelo. I am much less clear about where we should go from here. So
let me try to briefly explain. I think the Supreme Court got it right
because my understanding of the decision is really quite different
from what I think most people's understanding is, based on the me-
dia accounts, public discussions, and perhaps brief perusal of the de-
cision.
You can roughly divide Supreme Court cases into two categories.
Some of them are basically decisions about legal policy. They decide
what you can and you can't do under the Constitution. Other deci-
sions are really about institutional choice. They are about who is go-
ing to decide what we can and cannot do.
The Kelo decision has been widely reported as if it were a decision
about legal policy with respect to eminent domain, as if the Court
said: "Takings for economic development are fine. Go right ahead,
take everybody's property. Take the Motel Six and turn it into a Ritz
Carlton. Go for it." But that's not my understanding of the decision
at all. My understanding is that it was basically about institutional
choice. The Court was struggling with the question of which institu-
tions in our society should decide what the proper limits of eminent
domain are. And what the Court decided, consistent with the Court's
long history in this area, is that the one institution which is not well-
suited to decide these issues is the United States Supreme Court.139
Or derivatively, other federal courts in the federal system.
Instead the Court said, as Scott mentioned briefly, the issue
should be decided by state courts under state constitutional law. By
state legislators-or national legislators-placing statutory limits on
the exercise of eminent domain. And by local elected politicians rep-
resenting the people of their communities in deciding when eminent
domain is needed and when it's not.'4°
So the Court did not say there's open season on your property,
everything is up for grabs. It didn't sound a gong starting the race in
which everybody is going to race out and see how much property they
can condemn for any reason whatsoever. The Court was simply re-
solving a question about how these issues are going to be decided go-
ing forward. And I think it resolved them correctly.
Just a couple comments about why I think that question was re-
solved correctly. The U.S. Supreme Court has decided public use
139 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (declining to impose a
heightened standard of review on city development plans).
140 Id.
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cases, at least with some care and deliberation, approximately once
every twenty-five years.' 41 So if we are going to entrust the protection
of our property to the Supreme Court, it's going to be a rather rare
day that any of us can benefit from that type of review and oversight.
Scott told you a lot about the facts of the Kelo case from his perspec-
tive. About why the decision was an abuse. About why people were
out to get these property owners for no good cause and so forth.
Those are not the kind of inquiries that can be resolved very well by a
U.S. Supreme Court that intervenes once every twenty-five years, or
even by federal courts asked to decide public use cases on an episodic
basis when these issues are primarily resolved by state and local offi-
cials and by state courts. Rather we need to have people that are re-
sponsible for the decisions also be responsible for determining the
proper limitations.
Another reason why I think the Court was correct on this score is
that there are genuine national differences on this issue. This is not a
question like under the Free Speech Clause or perhaps one of the
free exercise of religion provisions in which we can say that we have a
clear conception of what the right answer is everywhere in the coun-
try. The State of South Dakota recently passed a statute ringingly
condemning the use of eminent domain for any but traditional pub-
lic uses. 142 Well, South Dakota can easily do that because there's a lot
of empty land in South Dakota and you don't really need to use emi-
nent domain in order to assemble parcels of land to do much of any-
thing. It's quite a different story on the East Coast. In communities
like New York City, Boston, Baltimore, and so forth, where land is
carved up into many, many different parcels, if any type of economic
redevelopment is to take place inside urban areas some sort of as-
sembly is needed-which means using the power of eminent domain.
So there are genuine national differences on this score, which ought
to be reflected in the law.
A second, and I think more fundamental reason why goes to what
the intellectual right or the legal basis is going to be for asking courts
at any level, whether they be federal courts or state courts, to resolve
contested questions about when eminent domain can and cannot be
used. And I would submit to you that Scott and his cohorts at the In-
stitute for Justice have a problem in terms of the coherence of their
argument. Let me see if I can explain the problem as briefly as possi-
ble.
141 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that Hawaii's use of emi-
nent domain did not violate the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that Congress's power to enact redevelopment legislation
includes aesthetic as well as health decisions).
142 H.R. 1080,80th Sess. Leg. Assem. (S.D. 2005).
[Vol. 9:2
Jan. 2007] 2006 TEMPLETON LECTURE: EMINENT DOMAIN POST KELO 529
Basically I think they mix up two different things in their argu-
ments. They mix up questions about the ends of government and
questions about the means by which government proceeds to try to
secure its ends. The ends of government include things like securing
public safety, public health and education for our children, streets,
sewers, and so forth. 143 The means by which government pursues
these ends include things like taxation, regulation, subsidies, and of
course eminent domain.4
Now the Supreme Court has said that the public use inquiry goes
to the ends of government.1 4 5 The question is whether or not the
power is being deployed for a legitimate end of the government. If
that is really what we are asking for, and the language of the Institute
for Justice in which it says that eminent domain should not be used
for economic development sounds in the same vein-I don't think
the argument for prohibiting eminent domain for this purpose can
be sustained.
Let me give you a brief example to try to illustrate what I'm talk-
ing about. Suppose that you live in a city that has a million dollars
left over in its budget in a given year, and the city council is debating
what to do with the money. One group says, "Let's build a new ice
skating rink. Recreation." Another group says, "Why don't we build
some low-income housing and help assure that poor people have
some place to live?" And a third group says, "No, I think we really
need to stimulate the local economy, let's have some economic de-
velopment. Let's see if we can get a new shopping center in here,
which will create some more jobs and some new revenues for our
community."
Now if you pursued any of those ends by simply spending the mil-
lion dollars, I don't think anybody would go to a federal court and
argue that the federal court had the power to stop the city from do-
ing it. Maybe at one time in our country such an argument would be
heard. Maybe at one time people would have said that recreation is
not a legitimate end for government to pursue; that's something that
the private sector should supply. Or certainly during the Lochner
era146of the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century, some
people would have said that redistributing wealth and income is not a
145 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32 ("Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order [are] examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.").
14 Id. at 33 ("For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.").
145 See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241 ("[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is ra-
tionally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking
to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.").
146 The period following Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), when the Supreme Court
struck down economic legislation designed to protect the disadvantaged as illegal redistribution
of wealth.
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legitimate function of government, so government ought not be al-
lowed to build low-income housing to redistribute to the poor.
But virtually at no time in our history would somebody say that the
city council could not pursue the end of economic development.
From the very first days of our republic, government has been in-
volved in trying to improve local economies in all sorts of ways to
make life better for their community. So whether the question is
spending money or subsidizing or offering zoning variances or other
regulatory tools, I don't think any legitimate argument can be made
that economic development is an impermissible end of government,
any more than recreation is impermissible or wealth redistribution is
impermissible. So if the end of economic development is something
within the powers of government, where do we get the constitutional
limitation on using eminent domain? Well, it would have to be in the
means-that somehow this is not an appropriate means to pursue in
seeking the end of economic development.
But the Institute offers no argument as to why it's an impermissi-
ble means. The general notion in constitutional law is that if the end
is permissible then the government can decide whichever means it
wants to pursue. 147 If the end of recreation is permissible, and you
need to condemn land to build the ice skating rink, you can con-
demn the land for the ice skating rink. If the end of economic redis-
tribution is legitimate, and you need to condemn land for a low-
income housing project, you can condemn the land for the low-
income housing project. So if economic development is legitimate,
where do we get the principle that we can't condemn the land for
economic redevelopment?
Now a couple of pragmatic arguments might be offered as to why
a limitation on takings for economic development makes sense. In
an economics vein you might say, "Well, economic development is
just a zero sum game. If one community condemns land for a big
box store, they're just shifting the store from one community to an-
other, no one is ever going to really be made better off by that."
There is something to this argument, but it's not the complete an-
swer. Certainly if property rights are rearranged in a way that actually
lowers the cost of engaging in and transacting business, there are
genuine benefits to society, gains in the form of a bigger pie. Produc-
tivity is increased, and we have real economic development. And, by
the way, how are courts supposed to figure out what sort of economic
arguments about the use of eminent domain make sense and which
ones don't? It doesn't seem like something the courts are very well
suited to do.
147 See, e.g., Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (requiring only that the means be "rationally related" to a
legitimate end).
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The second pragmatic argument might be a political science ar-
gument. You might say, "well," and Scott's talk is laced with these
sorts of insinuations, "local politicians are in the pockets of develop-
ers. We can't trust them. Whatever the developers want the local
politicians are going to do, so we can't allow eminent domain to be
used for economic development because it will just be used to line
the pockets of the developers." Well again, there's something to be
concerned about here. Developers pay lots of attention to local poli-
ticians. But many people think that the real driving force in local
communities is not developers, it's local homeowners-"homevoters,"
as economist Bill Fischel of Dartmouth calls them.148 And it's much
more likely that homevoters and local politicians are going to line up
to sort of extract some wealth out of developers than I think it is that
developers and politicians are going to line up to fleece homevoters
by taking their property from them. And again the question is how
are courts supposed to figure all this out? How are courts supposed
to know that in fact developers have captured local politicians and
therefore they can't be allowed to use the power of eminent domain?
This is not the kind of decision on which we base constitutional
rights.
I think the real basis for objection to cases like Kelo is an implicit
balancing exercise that the benefits using eminent domain for eco-
nomic development are too small, are too speculative, to warrant the
intrusion on property rights that are entailed by taking people's
homes and businesses for these sorts of ends. But that is a policy
judgment. That's a kind of judgment that depends on the facts of a
particular case in particular circumstances. It's the kind of judgment
that local politicians and local judges are much better at making as a
matter of policy than federal judges are as a matter of federal consti-
tutional right. And so I think the Kelo decision was basically sound in
saying that that's where the decision ought to be left.
Now where do we go from here? I agree with Scott that I think
the backlash to Kelo is a much more interesting phenomenon than
the Kelo decision itself. The backlash to Kelo is a true moment of
popular constitutionalism. It's a very dramatic moment in our history
where the public has become very energized by a constitutional issue.
It's become much more aware of the issue than it was before. Things
are in flux, we don't really know what's going to happen, where we're
going to end up.
I myself have in the past argued that we need procedural reforms
of eminent domain; we need reforms in the system of compensation.
I think it's too soon really to know whether either of these reforms
148 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIs, at ix (2001).
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makes sense at this point in time. One thing that I do think has hap-
pened is that the issue has been radically transformed. The media
has discovered this issue. It's discovered that it's riveting television to
show persons in front of their properties that are about to be con-
demned, or it's a great newspaper story to talk about eminent domain
being used for economic development. And as long as the media has
this in its sights we may not need process reform or compensation re-
form, because the very mobilization of society on this issue is more
than enough to provide protection for people's property rights for
the foreseeable future. Maybe that will die out. Maybe the reform
movement will fade, in which case we need to reconsider other pro-
tections of people's property rights at an appropriate time period.
But as things stand right now, as I see it, the greater danger perhaps
is an overreaction to the use of eminent domain. There is a danger
that eminent domain will be legally constricted in ways that will pro-
hibit local communities from making decisions that, not only do they
want to preserve property rights, but they also want to preserve them-
selves as communities. And I think that's a decision that local com-
munities in this country are entitled to make for themselves. Thank
you.
KMIEC: Professor Merrill, will you put a question to Mr. Bullock?
MERRILL: Sure. Alright Scott, you don't like the use of eminent
domain for economic development, you've made that pretty clear.
So what is your advice to the New Londons of this world? Cities that
are struggling economically, that have high unemployment rates, that
don't seem to be able to attract any new businesses, that have lots of
areas within the city that are, if not blighted in any technical sense, at
least are not exactly booming. What sort of tools do you think they
should use in order to revitalize themselves if you're not going to let
them use the power of eminent domain?
BULLOCK: Well I think there are any number of tools that gov-
ernment can use if government decides to get into the development
game, which I think is a very iffy proposition in and of itself and one
that I'm a skeptic of, in general, the notion that government should
be really driving the marketplace on these matters rather than letting
it up to the marketplace. But I recognize that that's really a policy
decision for the government to make if they choose to do so; that is
up to them, and they may suffer the consequences from that because
of the very mixed, at best, history of these types of projects. At best
many of them have failed to live up to expectations. And in many in-
stances they were total disasters because again they were not driven by
the marketplace, but often times were driven by subsidies and other
types of frankly corporate welfare that the government did in addi-
tion to using eminent domain power.
So there are regulatory incentives that the government can use to
attract development. But what I have seen over and over again in
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these instances is this is not a choice between economic development
on the one hand and protecting the rights of property owners on the
other. And New London is a perfect example of that. New London
right now has over twice the land available to it in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood to do economic development than what New York City
has to rebuild the World Trade Center.4 9 You can do economic de-
velopment; you can keep people in their homes, in just about every
case that I'm aware. Yes, changes might have to be made. Develop-
ers' plans may have to be reworked a bit. But that happens every sin-
gle day in this country. And the good news is that most development
in this country does not involve the use of eminent domain. And I
think that that is likely to continue.
KMIEC: Scott, let me just interject an audience question. It came
up during the oral argument with the Penn and Temple students,
and it has come from the audience again. In addition, you men-
tioned it in your main presentation that the area involved was 1.5
acres out of ninety acres. Why didn't local officials try to reach an ac-
commodation with the residents of New London? Why trigger a Su-
preme Court case other than to give a wonderful topic to the
Templeton Lecture Series?
BULLOCK: I have asked myself that question, really ever since we
got involved in this issue-in this particular case. And I certainly
asked myself that question after the trial court decision was handed
down, where, as I said, they ruled in favor of most of the property
owners and the trial judge stayed all of the condemnations, 5 making
it so that nothing would be able to happen for at the very least a year,
and then it went on to be I think almost two years before a decision
was handed down by the Connecticut Supreme Court. So I simply
don't know. Thankfully now there is movement and discussion in
Connecticut and in New London toward that goal of getting the de-
velopment moving on the parcels owned by the NLDC, while still let-
ting the people who want to stay keep their homes.
MERRILL: Part of the answer may be that the New London project
really wasn't economically viable. The money for acquisition of
property, as I understand it, came entirely from the State of Con-
necticut. '51 And there was no real prospect of earning a significant
quick return on the development of this area. In contrast, in New
149 LOWER MANHATTAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WORLD TRADE CENTER SITE OVERVIEW
(2002), http://www.renewnyc.com/plan-des-dev/wtc-site/Sept2003Overview.asp (presenting
a design study for the 16-acre site).
150 See Kelo v. City of New London, 2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Mar. 13, 2002), rev'd in
part 268 Conn. 1,843 A.2d 500, 508 (2004), affd 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
151 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2659 (2005) (noting that Connecticut
authorized a $5.35 million bond issue, and a $10 million bond issue to support the New Lon-
don Development Corporation and creation of Fort Trumbull State Park).
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York City-I don't know how many of you saw the New York Times to-
day-but the Forest City Ratner project at the Atlantic Yards in
Brooklyn recently announced that they have now acquired virtually
100% of the privately owned apartments in the area that they're seek-
ing to condemn for this massive economic redevelopment there. 52
How were they able to do that? Well they basically paid double
the capital gains that people would have gotten had they sold their
apartments on the market. The reason they were able to pay such
large compensation is there's an enormous amount of money on the
table in that project because it is economically viable, it's going to be
wildly successful. And so the developer is willing to put the money
out to buy these people out. In New London, it was a very iffy pro-
gram, there wasn't a lot of money, and so they didn't have a lot to
play with.
KMIEC: I understand, although I must say if there's no money,
Tom, I would think that the proposition of avoiding litigation costs
and creating a project that would have settled this matter amicably
might have been even more appealing. I have my own supposition,
and it relates to the well-entrenched precedent before Kelo. Berman v.
Parker,53 and the Midkif 54 case in Hawaii, both gave enormous defer-
ence to the judgment of public decision-makers in terms of the issue
of economic development. Their thinking could well have been-we
have this broad power; why concede any part of it? Why give it up? It
was only the Kelo case that basically exposed the depth, or the perva-
siveness of the use, or if you will abuse, of the power that created any
sense of limitation.
We have by remote television the good people of New London lis-
tening into our discussion. They are assembled at Mitchell College,
and we are delighted to see you all this evening. Is there a question
you would like to share with us?
QUESTION: How do you determine just compensation when you
break up neighborhoods? And will this make it easier for economical
development agencies to use that power of eminent domain for fu-
ture use?
BULLOCK: I'll just take a quick crack at that. Yes, definitely-the
Kelo decision definitely makes it easier for governments to use emi-
nent domain for private development purposes. And the question of
just compensation is one that wasn't at issue in the Kelo case; it's one
that we're not focused on in our litigation at the Institute for Justice.
But it's one that the Supreme Court, interestingly enough, had a lot
152 Nicholas Confessore, Forced to Move, Some Find Greener Grass, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 2006, at
B1.
153 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
15 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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of questions about. Several of the Justices seemed to be quite con-
cerned about the fact that once property is condemned, the current
property owner only gets the appraised value of the property at the
time of the taking. And any increase in the value of the property,
which inevitably happens when property is re-zoned commercial goes
to the new owner of the property. ManyJustices saw that as unfair. It
seemed like they almost wanted to grapple with it in the Kelo case,
and then they realized, I think, that this was not the appropriate case
to do so since the compensation question was not present. I think a
number of legislatures are looking at this issue, talking about bump-
ing up the level of compensation. And that's probably where the
changes might come. Judges are very uncomfortable trying to decide
who is more worthy of compensation than somebody else.
MERRILL: The criticism is frequently made, and it's entirely valid,
that the fair market value formula does not compensate you for
things like lost community ties or some kind of particular value that
you give to the property which is not captured by how the market val-
ues the property. If everyone valued their property exactly the way
the market does, then presumably they would have already sold. So
there's reason to be concerned that eminent domain systematically
undercompensates people. And there are a whole bunch of propos-
als kicking around for doing something about that. The Federal Re-
location Act 156 does require relocation payments, which can be sub-
stantial and are given in many of these cases right now. And I myself
have toyed with various ideas for bonus compensation that might try
to compensate some of these subjective losses. For example, you
could give a one percent bonus above fair market value for each year
that someone's been in occupancy of their property. That would
mean that long-standing occupants like the Derys, for example,
would get substantial bonus compensation.
KMIEC: We have another question from the audience here, and I
think it's asked with all sincerity. And I think it picks up some of the
poignancy of the topic. It asks Professor Merrill and Mr. Bullock
whether either of you would be happy having your house taken, even
if you received bonus compensation?
BULLOCK: I live in an apartment now, so that...
MERRILL: Me too. I don't have to face that risk. The thing about
eminent domain that I think is at the bottom of the great stress that it
creates is that it's coercive. The government is basically coercing
people out of their businesses, out of their homes, out of their prop-
erty against their will. And in a free society, we don't like the gov-
155 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 48-51.
1 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and
Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-55 (2000).
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ernment exerting coercive power like that-we'd like to minimize it
as much as possible. And I think that is a very valid point. Nobody
really wants to be coerced to do something like leaving their home,
and that gives us good reason to want to restrict the power.
On the other hand there's a lot of evidence that the more money
you pay, the more people are willing to sort of swallow hard and get
on with their lives. That might be one reason for bonus compensa-
tion.
BULLOCK: I would not like to give up my home, and certainly the
home that I grew up in, for private development purposes. And I
think that's true of most people. And I think that that's what distin-
guishes this from other types of takings for traditional public uses. I
think people understand that sometimes people have to give up their
property for a road or a reservoir or something of that nature. But I
think it's deeply offensive to most Americans that the government
could take your land, not for a project that again the government
would own or that people would have equal right of access to. But
basically to give it to somebody who's in the same position that you
are in: another private party who just happens to typically be wealth-
ier than what you are. The Fort Trumbull plan, for instance, calls for
residences in this area-the high-end condominiums that I men-
tioned. So I think that that's what really strikes people very deeply in
this matter-it's not only that the government is taking one of your
most prized possessions, but they're then giving it to somebody who is
just like you, but just richer.
KMIEC: We have a number of questions, again from the audience
here, on precedent. Justice Stevens, the author of the Kelo opinion
gave a rather extraordinary address to a bar association in Nevada, 57
where he in essence said precedent made me do it.18  And that
prompted me to look up something thatJonathan Swift once wrote in
Gulliver's Travels, and it goes like this:
It is a Maxim among these Lawyers, that whatever hath been done before
may legally be done again: and therefore they take special Care to re-
cord all the Decisions formerly made against common Justice and gen-
eral Reason of Mankind. These, under the Name of Precedents, they
produce as Authorities to justify the most iniquitous Opinions; and the
Judges never fail in directing accordingly.
59
157 Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 2005, at
Al (recounting Justice Stevens's address to the Clark County Bar Association in Las Vegas).
158 See id. (noting that Justice Stevens called the eminent domain law "unwise" but permissi-
ble under the Constitution).
159 JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS Part IV, Ch. 5, 1 15 (1726).
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To what degree do you both believe thatJustice Stevens's explanation
that precedent made him do it is correct? And if you think the
precedent did make him do it, was the precedent mistaken?
MERRILL: Oh, I think he was being sincere in that statement. If
you read the opinion carefully he cites quite a number of decisions
that go back all the way to the late-nineteenth century. 16° Now this is
one of Scott's blind spots that I keep telling him about and he keeps
ignoring. The entire theory of the case that the Institute for Justice
developed depended upon the proposition that there were only two
precedents. There was Midkiff and there was Berman. And that they
were distinguishable, because both of them involved situations where
the pre-condemnation use of the property was creating a public harm
that the condemnation itself would rectify or overcome.' And so
they had a theory of precedent, they had the two cases, and they had
their way of distinguishing the cases which then gave the Court a new
line that it could draw to avoid extrapolating the right of eminent
domain any further.
The amicus brief that I did in the case was largely designed to tell
the Court that in fact there were a bunch of earlier cases from the
late-nineteenth to early-twentieth century that involved things like ir-
rigation lines to fields, drainage ditches, aerial mining lines that took
minerals from a mine to a rail head. 62 And the Court, in those cases,
upheld these exercises in eminent domain on the grounds that this
was necessary to the prosperity of the community. And so essentially
you did have these older precedents that authorized the use of emi-
nent domain for economic development. It was not shopping centers
and hotels; it was mines and irrigation ditches, but it was still con-
ceived of as economic development. And Stevens cited all those cases
and talked about them, so I think he went and read them. And I
think he in fact was-and he talked a lot about Ruckleshaus v. Mon-
160 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661-68 (2005) (citing Missouri Pacific
R.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896), and Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S.
112, 158-64 (1896)).
161 See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 14, at 24-27 (arguing that nether the Berman decision,
which authorized the use of eminent domain to eradicate urban blight, nor the Midkiff Court's
authorization of eminent domain in order to regulate the oligopoly of land ownership in Ha-
waii, are similar to the present case, which involves the taking of non-blighted property for the
use of private entities).
162 See Brief for the American Planning Association as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents,
at 3-11, Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (No. 04-108), available at http://www.planning.org/amicusbriefs/
pdf/kelo.pdf (highlighting Supreme Court decisions upholding the use of eminent domain in
O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (drainage ditches); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (aerial mining lines); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) (irriga-
tion lines)).
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santo,163 which is a trade secrets case, which again goes beyond the two
cases that Scott knows about, and cited in his briefs.
And so I think Stevens actually was impressed by this body of
precedent, by the fact that the Court had decided a dozen cases in
this area and it had always come out the same way, with the exception
of once. And I think he felt that this was too much inertia to over-
come at this point in time.
BULLOCK: Well just briefly, I think you have to read our briefs a
little bit more carefully, because we do deal with those earlier cases. I
mean there was some broader language in those cases similar to the
way there was broader language in the Midkiff case written by Justice
O'Connor. But things like irrigation ditches would fall into the cate-
gory of things like instrumentalities of commerce, common carriers,
other...
MERRILL: These were private irrigation ditches.
BULLOCK: If you read carefully the cases and look at our briefs for
this you will see that all of them were a part of a larger network of ir-
rigation ditches that were of the equivalent essentially of utility
lines'64-that also were privately owned, but people have equal right
of access to them. So I think that given the march of precedent in
the Supreme Court towards a broader reading of the public use re-
quirement, what we were trying to do in Kelo was to establish some
outer limits on this. And we said, regardless of whether or not Berman
and Midkiff were rightly decided, there should at least be an outer
limit on eminent domain. And I think we provided a way, Justice
O'Connor, and the other Justices picked up on this, of distinguishing
those earlier cases from this one in saying that there is nothing harm-
165ful or offensive about the conditions of land ownership in this case.
And therefore that should be the outer limits on eminent domain for
where private parties are.involved.
I think you can harmonize those decisions with the ... with the
thought I think should have been the right decision in the Kelo case,
the decision by Justice O'Connor, or as many of the amicus briefs
urge the Court to do to take a look at some of these older precedents
and take the route that Justice Thomas did,'6 which was to get back
to the original meaning and understanding of the public use clause.
Even though I think he's right as a matter of constitutional interpre-
tation and of precedent, I knew that there would likely be very few, if
any, votes for that position on the Supreme Court. That turned out
to be the case;Justice Thomas wrote alone in that area.
163 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
1 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 14, at 21-22 n.18.
15 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672-74 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 2677-87 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
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I should also mention real quickly that Justice Stevens, in that
same speech said that not only did he feel bound by precedent, but
he felt as a legislator, if he were a legislator, he would vote against the
use of eminent domain for private development because he thinks
it's a bad policy and it typically doesn't work.1 67 So I think that that's
an important message that legislators should pick up on-that the au-
thor of the Kelo case does not support eminent domain abuse as a
policy matter.
KMIEC: I'm going to the residents of New London at Mitchell Col-
lege in a moment, but first, one more question from here in Phila-
delphia. I'm going to combine a number of questions which will al-
low you to answer in a number of different ways.
As you know, the Supreme Court is under new management. We
now have the Roberts Court instead of the Rehnquist Court and
there are other changes. Two of the dissenters, the late Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor are no longer present on the Court.
Does the presence of a new Chief Justice and a new Associate Justice
forecast a change in outcome? Or do you need to have another
change in personnel to get that change in outcome? In other words,
might there be not just a legislative solution, but ajudicial one in the
offing? And if so, what might thatjudicial limit look like? Would the
judicial limit perhaps focus on what I think is deeply felt across the
nation that a home is something different than any other form of
property? It is the closest thing to the expression of the human per-
sonality itself. Is it likely that as the Court has recognized the special
place of the home, for example, in First Amendment jurisprudence,
that they might recognize the unique place of the home in the con-
text of this issue as well?
So two questions-the change in personnel and what would a ju-
dicial change in perspective look like?
BULLOCK: Well, there's a lot to say about both of those, but I'm
going to try to keep it brief to get to as many questions as possible.
Real quick response to the first one. No, it would not change the
outcome in Kelojust as simple matter of vote counting since the two
new Justices replaced Justices that were in the dissent in the Kelo
case.T6s So it would not change the outcome, at least immediately.
We hope that the Supreme Court at some time in the future does re-
visit the Kelo decision, does overturn it. And it is an interesting ques-
tion as to whether or not they would focus on the home. I would
note that that would be the case-from reading most of the Supreme
Court decisions that have come about where the Court has not rec-
ognized a special protection to the home, at least outside of the
167 See Greenhouse, supra note 157.
16 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671.
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Fourth Amendment area. But the Court just recently, ironically
enough, I believe it was Justice Souter, said in a Fourth Amendment
case decided by the Court that a person's "home is his castle. 1 69 This
of course is one year after Justice Souter gave very little respect for a
person's castle in the Kelo case.
So I think it's a possibility, but I would hope that there would be a
broader precedent that would apply, not just owner-occupied homes,
but rental properties. And to small businesses as well that often times
bear the brunt of the use of eminent domain for private develop-
ment.
KMIEC: And Tom, in responding, do you have any thoughts on
some form of intermediate scrutiny whether linked to the home or
not?
MERRILL: No, I don't think that's going to go anywhere. I do
think that the Supreme Court follows the election returns, as Mr.
Dooley said. 170 All courts do. And the huge public outcry, the hub-
bub over Kelo has not gone unnoticed by judges in this country. So I
think it's a safe prediction that we will see some movement on this
front. I think what you are most likely to see is a raft of state court
decisions under state constitutional law that are much more restric-
tive about eminent domain.
As far as the U.S. Supreme Court is concerned, what might hap-
pen I think would be that if you got a sort of cognate case that in-
volved eminent domain, but not necessarily the public use issue-and
what I have in mind in particular it would be an issue about the due
process rights of property owners whose property is targeted for emi-
nent domain. The Supreme Court has got some very sketchy deci-
sional law on this point. And there are some wild decisions in the
lower courts; the Rhode Island Supreme Court just recently rendered
a decision in which they said, reaffirming some earlier cases, that the
procedural due process right does not apply in eminent domain.17
Now if a case like that were decided, and got up to the Supreme
Court, I think the Justices would, with great alacrity, rule that that's
wrong and would try to send a signal that they are sensitive to the
constitutional rights of people whose property is being taken by emi-
nent domain. But I don't see much prospect in the near term future
with ratcheting up public use review.
169 Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1523 (2006) (holding that a physically present co-
occupant's refusal to allow a warrantless search of the premises renders the warantless search
invalid and unreasonable as to him under the Fourth Amendment).
170 Finley Peter Dunne, The Supreme Court's Decisions, in MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS, 21, 26
(1901) ("[N]o matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme court follows
th' iliction returns.").
171 R.I. Econ. Dev. v. The Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 102 (R.I. 2006) ("The Due Process Clause
does not guarantee a property owner any particular form or method of state procedure.").
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KMIEC: And New London, do you have a question for us?
QUESTION: What are your opinions on passing ombudsman legis-
lation to minimize litigation in eminent domain cases?
BULLOCK: I think it is a good idea to establish an ombudsman's
office in state legislatures where property owners can set forth their
complaints. Although I don't want to see that as a replacement for
substantive reform of the eminent domain laws. I think it can be a
part of it; that's something that's being proposed in Connecticut. But
I don't think it should be a substitute for restrictions on the use of
eminent domain for private economic development.
MERRILL: One of the problems with Scott's focus on substantive
public use rights is: where are you going to get the lawyers to enforce
these rights? The dirty little secret about eminent domain is that
most people whose property is condemned do not have a big bank
account in which they can go and hire some fancy lawyer at $300 or
$400 an hour to represent them through endless proceedings and
appeals about whether this is a public use or not. And so that's one
reason why people tend to cave in. And why there's not a lot of pro-
tection through the public use requirements.
What does happen in eminent domain is that when people's
property actually is condemned they can hire a lawyer to represent
them because that lawyer is paid through a contingency fee contract.
The lawyer gets a percentage of the recovery. And so there's a lot of
institutional reasons why people whose property is condemned don't
have a lot of protections through the judiciary on the public use
front. Ombudsman would be one suggestion where you would get
some kind of advocate for individual property owners that could at
least steer them through the process and provide some guidance to
them without them having to go out and pay for an expensive lawyer.
BULLOCK: Yes, that's real quick and Tom's exactly right. I mean
it is very difficult for ordinary home and small business owners to af-
ford a lawyer. The folks in New London never could have been able
to afford this if it wasn't for a group like ours that would step in and
pay the legal costs.
MERRILL: And your group can't represent everybody in the
county.
BULLOCK: Absolutely not. And that's why we need to have sub-
stantive changes to eminent domain laws to make sure the govern-
ment can't do this in the first instance. Because that is a huge
weapon that the government has in supposedly negotiating with
property owners, is that the cost of the legal battle will quickly exceed
the value of the property itself. So that is something the governments
use over and over again against property owners. And if you have
something that said you cannot use this for private development pur-
poses, then property owners would never be placed in that situation
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of having to go to court and trying to afford a lawyer to fight these
battles.
KMIEC: I'd like to conclude with something that I found in the
litigation record of Berman v. Parker, the case or precedent that so
bound Justice Stevens and the majority that they felt they could not
depart from it and rule in favor of Susette Kelo and the other resi-
dents of New London.
As the Berman case was coming up to the Supreme Court, it was
being resolved by a judge named Barrett Prettyman. Judge Pretty-
man had the following observation-or questions if you will. He
asked,
Is a modern apartment house a better breeder of men than is the de-
tached or row house? Is the local corner grocer a less desirable commu-
nity asset than the absentee stockholder in the national chain or the
wage-paid manager? Are such questions as these to be decided by the
Government? And, if the decisions be adverse to the erstwhile owners
and occupants, is their entire right to own the property thereby de-
stroyed?
And he continued, "The terms 'public use' and 'public purpose' have
never been defined with precision, and cannot be.... But even the
most liberal courts have put boundaries upon the meanings."173 Re-
member the context of Berman was urban renewal: the economic re-
development of southwestern Washington, D.C. The redevelopment
held out a promise to the people living in very poor and destitute
conditions that when the renewal was finished there would be new
housing that they could afford and occupy. Of course that never
came to pass. When those words went to the Supreme Court in Ber-
man v. Parker, and the Supreme Court examined Judge Prettyman's
considerations and his questions, the Court very consciously decided
not to create limits but to remove them. And so in the notes of Jus-
tice Douglas and Justice Burton one finds, "I appreciate the modifica-
tions in the recirculated final opinion of Berman v. Parker and now see
that they remove the objectionable limitations placed there by the
lower court.'
74
172 Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 719 (D.D.C. 1953).
173 Id. at 720.
174 Professor Barros writes:
The conference notes show that the Supreme Court wanted nothing to do with Pret-
tyman's restrictive view of public use. Justice Douglas's notes have Chief Justice Warren's
position as: "project is within the statute + is constitutional-what they [the District of
Columbia] did was reasonable-he [the Chief Justice] would go further than the Ct. of
Appeal [i.e., Prettyman sitting as part of the district court panel] which unduly restricted
the Act-affirm on broader ground than the ct of appeal." Justice Burton's notes also
have Warren's position as "go beyond Court of Appeals." There are no remarks for any
of the other Justices beyond "agree with CJ" or "affirm and modify" in either Burton's or
Douglas's notes.
[Vol. 9:2
Jan. 2007] 2006 TEMPLETON LECTURE: EMINENT DOMAIN POST KELO 543
So when it comes to constitutional protections, we seldom lose
them by inadvertence. These things don't happen by accident. The
choices we make are the choices that give meaning to the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Once again, from the National Constitu-
tion Center in Philadelphia, I thank Dr. Templeton for providing a
lectureship that enlightens us about our liberty and its meaning.
Thank you very much.
The opinion in Berman was assigned to Douglas. A handwritten note dated November
12, 1954, from Burton to Douglas shows that Burton apparently felt that Douglas's first
circulated draft did not go far enough in repudiating Prettyman's position:
Dear Bill,
While I believe I agree with the statements you make in the Redevelopment case it
seems to me that the specific interpretations made by Prettyman will cause much
trouble and confusion unless treated more specifically. Therefore, unless you or
someone else does it, I shall probably want to attempt it in a concurrence. This
means some delay.
HHB
Another memorandum indicates that Douglas's next draft was more to Burton's liking:
Dear Bill:
I appreciate the modifications in the recirculated opinion and see no adequate rea-
son for me to write anything. Please include me in your "Court."
H.H.B.
And indeed, Douglas's opinion for a unanimous Court clearly and specifically repudi-
ates Prettyman's views. For example, Douglas wrote:
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line nor to sit in re-
view on the size of a particular project area. Once the question of the public purpose
has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and
the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion
of the legislative branch. ...
The District Court indicated grave doubts concerning the Agency's right to take
full title to the land as distinguished from the objectionable buildings located on it.
We do not share those doubts.
The only concession to potential limits on legislative power was made in response to a
suggestion by Chief Justice Warren, who asked Douglas to add "Subject to specific consti-
tutional limitations" to the sentence quoted above that in the final opinion continues
"when the legislature has spoken, public interest has been declared in terms well nigh
conclusive." Obviously, the Court did not consider the public use clause to be "a specific
constitutional limitation."
Nothing Errant About It: The Berman v. Parker Conference Notes,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/property/2005/1O/the-berman-v-pa.html (Oct. 17, 2005).
